Franjo Tu man and Slobodan Milo evi at Kara or evo in March 1991 caused and determined the course of Yugoslavia's wars 7 Burg and Shoup stake out a middle ground by asserting that the region was a "segmented society" which functioned despite its "violent history" and became unstable once its Yugoslav "civic culture" disappeared. 8 Their position echoes the argument made by a number of writers, including Bogdan Denitch, who asserted that Bosnia, like Yugoslavia, had been evolving toward a synthetic "Yugoslav" nationality. 9 Such positions were usually adopted to rationalize the actions of one of the actors or to argue that the real problem was nationalism per se, not a particular variant. Variations on this theme included polemical arguments that some small nations are not viable, that some nationalisms are inherently democratic (Serbian) and others basically fascist (Croatian), and that nations experiencing civil strife had "failed" and needed to be treated as colonial subjects.
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None of these interpretations is entirely convincing. There were indications that some individuals and groups were moving toward a Yugoslav identity and that past differences based on national identity had been eroded, but there was also evidence that national identity remained strong and continued to determine social status, political access, and economic well-being for both individuals and groups. 11 Those who considered nationalism an archaic remnant of a pre-postmodern world ignored such realities or distinguished "good" ("Bosnian") from "bad" (Croatian or Serbian) nationalism. Tanovi -Miller was typical in this respect, blaming Croatian and Serbian nationalists for all of Bosnia's problems but viewing Alija Izetbegovi and the SDA as guilty only of the venial sin of naiveté. She insists that, unlike the Croatian government, the Bosnian government had not "provoked" its Serbs; problems arose only as a result of "myths and brainwashing" by Serbian and Croatian nationalists. 12 Perhaps, but Tanovi -Miller was a member of a small, cosmopolitan elite, not unlike intellectuals in every country; there is little evidence most Bosnians were so open-minded. Those who believed that Bosnia's nationalities were merging into a "Yugoslav" nationality present little but anecdotal evidence and a slight increase in the absolute number of "Yugoslavs" in the census. Historically, the effort to create "Yugoslavs" did not fare well. King Alexander, who dominated Yugoslav politics from its creation in 1918 until his assassination in 1934, failed to impose a Yugoslav identity on his subjects in the early 1930s, and at the VIII Party Congress in 1964, Tito chided those who "confuse the unity of nations with the liquidation of nations." He compared efforts to create an "integral Yugoslav nation" to forced "assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, to unitarism and hegemony." The SKJ (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije), he declared, should promote the "flowering of all our national cultures" rather than "bourgeois" or "bureaucratic" nationalism disguised as Yugoslavism. 13 Although the Yugoslav republics became nationalist weed-beds after Tito's death, many observers continued to insist that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a viable multinational state.
14 There was also a tendency after 1991 to accept the definition of Muslims as a separate nationality by those who had previously questioned the legitimacy of such a definition and discerned dangers associated with the creation of a Muslim nation. Yet so long as Muslims were not "a separate nationality," they were under pressure to opt for a Croatian or a Serbian nationality, as Croatian and Serbian nationalists, both bourgeois and socialist, contested control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1969, two years before they officially achieved national status, Wayne Vucinich saw Muslims as "something approximating a nation," noting that to define them as such was one way out of the conundrum created when the SKJ rejected a "Yugoslav" nationality. 15 But defining Muslim as a "national" category just transferred the struggle for Bosnia from Serbia and Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the three nationalities vied for control after 1971, two with backing from the governments of other republics, the third with the support of coreligionists in Yugoslavia. To declare Muslims a nationality merely complicated the problem because national identity continued to define one's place socially, economically, politically and territorially. Given such conundrums and such conflicting evidence, it is probably prudent to conclude that the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia were not caused by "ancient hatreds" but also that the "ethnic" polarization evident in the early 1990s was not merely the result of recent events, but of long-term historical and cultural developments which contributed to the polarization and mutual distrust of Bosnia's three constituent peoples. Certainly, World War II, 16 as Serbian spokesmen insisted, was one of these events, but so too were the creation of which was shaped by multiple forces might not satisfy those who prefer simple explanations derived from models of ideal philosophical positions, but it seems the most realistic approach to the events of the early 1990s.
For five centuries, Bosnia was the buffer zone between Croatia and Serbia, and for a century its peoples and territories were contested by Croatian and Serbian nationalists. By 1990, Branka Maga believed its best hope lay in the resurrection of the "traditional coalition" of Muslims and Croats, hardly an encouraging prognosis, since it presupposed ethnic polarization as a given.
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There was a culture of tolerance and diversity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rooted in the millet system and idealized in the concepts of jugoslavenstvo (Yugoslavism) and bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity). But this culture was severely circumscribed and appears to have existed primarily in large urban areas. Bosnians of different religions may have on occasion shared the same zadruga and lived in the same villages, but they lived their lives apart and nursed images of each other as essentially different. 23 Austrian occupation relieved the worst abuses of the Ottoman system, but the Austrians preserved the existing order, which favored Muslim landlords, not Christian serfs. Like Belgrade in 1971, Vienna sought to parry claims by Croat and Serb nationalists by creating a new Bo njak nationality based on the region's Muslims. Austrian policies thus strengthened the link between national and agrarian questions, and they kept Bosnia's ethnic groups apart. When political parties formed, they were organized along national and confessional lines, with Orthodox Serbs looking to Belgrade and Catholic Croats to Zagreb. When forced to choose between a Croatian or a Serbian identity, most educated Muslims, repulsed by the anti-Islamic character of Serbian nationalism, opted for a Croatian affiliation because at least Croatian nationalists embraced Bosnia's Muslims as "the purest Croatians." But most Muslims simply took refuge in their religion and their past. 46 Such a history did not create warm feelings among Bosnia's ethnic groups. 47 At best, Croats and Serbs competed to claim the region's Muslims as members of their own ethnic group, rather than seeking an alliance of equals. At worst, the three groups resorted to violence to claim or hold territory. Following the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914, Muslims and Croats attacked Serbian businesses and cultural institutions. During the war, Croats and Muslims enjoyed a privileged position, but after Serbian forces had occupied Bosnia in 1918, Serbs attacked Muslims, both landlords and small holders, many of whom fled to Turkey. Those who stayed behind organized the JMO to defend all Muslims, regardless of class. 48 Islam had become a marker for nationality, to the disappointment of Stjepan Radi and other Croatian politicians. Like Franjo Tu man a half century later, 49 Radi believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would gravitate to Croatia and Slovenia. During the Paris Peace Conference he had requested the right to self-determination for Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia. He considered most Muslims to be ethnic Croatians and counted JMO deputies as if they were Croatian. In 1920, he hoped Bosnia would join Slovenia and Croatia in a "federated peasant republic of Yugoslavia." 50 But this did not happen. Instead, Bosnia-Herzegovina's peasants were disenfranchised, impoverished, and manipulated by appeals to religious affiliation. Upper-class Muslims who had welcomed the Serbian army as a force which would protect them against the lower classes were quickly disabused of their illusions. Within months, Serbian attacks on Muslims of all classes and the removal of Muslims and Croats from government posts provoked numerous protests by both nationalities. The struggle between Muslim landowners and Orthodox peasants took on religious and national overtones as the former sought to win the Muslim peasantry to their side, arguing that all Muslims must band together to defend themselves.
Land reform eventually dispossessed 4,000 Most Muslim deputies and some Muslim intellectuals declared themselves to be "Croatian" or Muslims who spoke "Croatian," but the JMO did not ally itself with Radi 's HSS, and many educated Muslims jettisoned their prewar Bo njak identity in favor of Yugoslavism, which served as a protective ideological coloration and enabled them, in Höpken's words, to "withdraw into a kind of isolated autarky formed around mosque, cultural center, and YMO [JMO] ." 53 But if Muslims paid lip-service to the concept of a unified Yugoslav state, the JMO's existed to defend the rights of Bosnia's Muslims, and it used Islam, not jugoslovenstvo, to mobilize them. 54 Serbian politicians attacked the JMO as a feudal anachronism espousing the Koran, but like most parties in the new state, it was linked to a particular group identified by confession, location, and ethnicity. 55 Its leaders asserted a national "individuality" based on religious, historical, social, and cultural traditions. They supported "full equality of rights for the three peoples" of Bosnia-Herzegovina and evoked jugoslovenstvo to demand "equality" (jedinstvenstvo) for Muslims and guarantees for the Islamic faith and its institutions. Like the SDA seventy years later, the JMO reached out to Muslims throughout Yugoslavia, urging Albanian and Turkish Muslims not to emigrate to Turkey and appealing to the Muslims in Sand ak and Montenegro as "blood of our blood" (krv na e krvi). In 1923, the party established the cultural organization Narodna Uzdanica to reinforce and ensure Muslim solidarity by educating Muslim youth in a "true national sense" and promoting pride in Muslim history and institutions. Like the HSS, the JMO controlled financial and commercial organizations, but unlike the Croatian party, whose anticlerical bias prevented it from cooperating with the Catholic Church, the Muslim organization was influential in Muslim religious societies. The JMO dominated political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina and helped to develop and promote a distinctly Muslim consciousness.
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In 1921, Mehmet Spaho and his party sided with the ruling Serbian parties, providing crucial support for the new constitution, but the following year, Belgrade jettisoned the JMO in favor of its own creation, the JMNO (Jugoslavenska muslimanska narodna organizacija). During the 1923 campaign, the party again appealed to Islamic solidarity, warning that the "existence" (opstanak) of Bosnia's Muslims was at stake and those who did not vote for them committed an "unpardonable sin before God and before the nation, for which posterity would damn them." 57 Few
Muslims sinned, and the JMO again carried their vote in Bosnia, just as the SLS (Slovenska Ludska Stranka) and the HRSS did the Catholic vote in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. 58 The three parties formed a short-lived pre ani front, but after Radi recognized the regime in 1925, the JMO again found itself isolated and under attack from the Serbian press, Serbian and Yugoslav paramilitary formations, and the government-supported JMNO. 62 Following Serbian threats to "amputate" Croatia and partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, Radi hoped Bosnia's Muslims would turn toward Croatia, but Spaho chose to collaborate with the government in Belgrade and evidently supported the amputation of Croatia in order to maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina intact, a choice reminiscent of Izetbegovi 's decision to seek an accommodation with Serbia in the summer of 1991. 63 Alexander subsequently banned all ethnic parties, organized a Yugoslav party, and split Bosnia-Herzegovina into three banovine, all with Serbian majorities, forcing Muslim leaders to use the cultural organization Narodna Uzdanica as a political vehicle. Spaho began to rebuild the JMO in 1931, briefly supported the opposition, but then joined Milan Stojadinovi 's Serbian-dominated government in 1937. Stojadinovi recruited Muslims for ministerial posts to give his government the appearance of a Yugoslav coalition, and Spaho accepted a vice-presidency in the government-supported JRZ (Jugoslavenska radikalna stranka). Stojadinovi moved Belgrade closer to Rome, and he adopted a number of fascist trappings, including the use of the term "vo a" (Duce/ Führer) and a party shirt. In 1938, Spaho opened a JRZ rally in Bijeljina by thanking Stojadinovi , "our Leader" (Vo a), for having brought Yugoslavia peace and stability, but he resigned in February 1939 over the creation of a Croatian banovina. 64 If Spaho and the JMO appear to have been political opportunists, their "precarious situation" in interwar Yugoslavia left them few choices. Bosnia's Muslims had been dispossessed, reduced to an impotent minority, demeaned and stereotyped as "lazy, fatalistic, and homosexual" Asians, a process of dehumanization similar to that suffered by Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo during the early 1990s at the hands of Serbian propagandists. 65 If threatened by the excesses of Serbian nationalists, Muslim leaders cooperated with Serbian politicians in order to ameliorate the repression exercised by Belgrade. They were clearly not the "natural" allies of the Croats, and while the creation of the Croatian Banovina in August 1939 helped to stabilize Croatian-Serbian relations, it triggered protests from the JMO, which did not want Bosnia-Herzegovina partitioned. But even foreign observers, while acknowledging the plight of the Muslims, saw them as either ethnic Serbs or ethnic Croats, and thus part of the "Croatian question," which dominated interwar Yugoslav politics. 66 Like everyone else, in 1939 the Croatians assumed that "Croatian" and "Serbian" Muslims would simply make their peace with the partition of Bosnia into Croatian and Serbian areas. The JMO was a byproduct of Serbian-Croatian competition and rejected the concept of "national unity" (narodno jedinstvo) in favor of a pragmatic approach to politics that stressed the need for Muslim unity in state dominated by a Serbian elite which had defined Muslims as the quintessential "other" from the formation of the Serbian state. 71 There are no precise figures regarding how many people died in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, but Bogoljub Ko ovi and Vladimir erjavi have reached a rough consensus. erjavi estimates that 316,000 people perished in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, including 174,000 civilians (of whom 89,000 died in camps), 70,000 collaborators, and 72,000 combatants. Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered the highest number and the highest percentage of war deaths in Yugoslavia because it hosted the most intense and prolonged fighting in a struggle which saw Serbian Chetniks kill Croats and Muslims, Muslim and Croat Usta a and Domobran forces kill Serbs and Partisans, and Partisans kill those who collaborated with the Axis, regardless of nationality. 72 The Partisans sought to defuse ethnic competition in BosniaHerzegovina by creating a multinational republic in 1945 and then conferring the status of nationality upon Yugoslavia's Muslims in 1971. The new definition of Muslims as a nation elevated them to equal status with the region's Serbs and Croats, encouraged scholarly research, and triggered a surge of Muslim nationalism, which included some mythmaking that alarmed both the Yugoslav regime and some Western scholars. 73 But Bosnia's history suggested that efforts to impose "brotherhood and unity" were unlikely to be more than superficially successful, and prior to 1966, rather than equitable treatment for all citizens, the regime sought to Serbianize ethnically mixed areas and systematically persecuted Croats. The Sarajevo daily , whose editorial board was dominated by Muslims and Serbs prior to 1989 and by the SDA after 1990, was generally hostile to Croatian interests. Croatians were under-represented on editorial boards and in the media, on the judiciary, and among public prosecutors. Although Croats comprised 21.7 percent of the republic's population, they accounted for only 12.7 percent of the membership of the Bosnian Party. 74 By both Serbianizing Bosnia-Herzegovina and creating a Muslim nationality, Tito's regime further divided the republic's nationalities and transferred the struggle for Bosnia from Belgrade and Zagreb to Sarajevo. The transformation occurred during a period of history which saw the consolidation of Muslim states, the assertion of Palestinian nationalism, and the emergence of fundamentalist Islamic movements abroad. The result, according to the pro-Serbian writer Nora Beloff, was the penetration of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1970s and early 1980s by an "Islamic fundamentalism" which attracted Muslim intellectuals and led to a new fascination with Islam. If not "fundamentalism," certainly a Muslim "nationalism" was evident; even Adil Zulfikarpa i announced that Muslim intellectuals could "go back to their roots and identify with the Moslem masses." 75 Although Wayne Vucinich considered Muslims to have become a "problem" by 1969 owing to their anti-Serbian attitudes, 76 Beloff's conclusion is overdrawn. Yet it is clear that many of the future leaders of the SDA, including Alija Izetbegovi , were influenced by the affirmation of a Muslim alternative to the West and that the freedom to be Muslim led intellectuals to embrace a Muslim identity. This was certainly true for Muhamed Filipovi , whose reassessment of Marxism cost him his job and invited attacks from both Sarajevo's Oslobo enje and Belgrade's NIN, which denounced him as anti-Serbian and pro-Croatian. Like Izetbegovi , he was also accused of being a "fundamentalist," but in the early 1990s, he found himself on the outside because he considered the SDA too Islamic. He subsequently joined Zulfikarpa i to create a liberal, secular, "Bosnian" party, which failed to attract even a tenth of the vote. 77 The communist regime had sought to create a "Muslim national identity," not an Islamic revival that would lead Yugoslavia's Muslims to identify with Islam as the basis for a new political order. When Alija Izetbegovi suggested that Muslims should work to reshape civil society according to Islamic principles because "there is no peace or coexistence between the Islamic faith and other non-Islamic social and political systems," the regime put him in jail. 78 The dilemma for Muslims was suggested by Izetbegovi in an interview in 1994. "By faith," he said, "we are Eastern (isto njaci), by education we are Europeans." So the heart of a Muslim looked East, his mind West, which for those who were honest involved a basic question of identity. The ideal resolution to this dilemma, he concluded, was to unite the religious and the secular and build a strong party. But his declaration a year later that "Free people are in reality the slaves of freedom" suggested a less than democratic worldview, nor could his declaration that Bosnia was the "promised land" of Muslims have reassured Bosnia's Croats and Serbs. 79 Claims like those put forward by Izetbegovi evoked images of an Islamic republic and conjured up the stereotype of the Muslim as fundamentalist, leading the Croatian economist, Branko Horvat, to suggested replacing the term "Muslim" with "Bosnian" to avoid adding to inter-ethnic tension in Bosnia. But neither Croats nor Serbs were comfortable redefining themselves only as Bosnians, and both groups rejected the use of the term for the republic's Muslims because it would have effectively identified them with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question of Muslim identity, as Sabrina Ramet has explained, was vexed. Some Muslims viewed themselves as "Muslim Croats" or "Muslim Serbs, others as "Bosnian Muslims" or simply "Muslims." A small minority identified themselves as "atheist Muslims" or "Yugoslavs."80 But if Muslim identity was a vexed question, so was the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there was no more consensus among Muslims about how to resolve it than there was among Croats and Serbs. 81 But there was a consensus of sorts during the 1990 elections. The three "national" parties took 85.1 percent of the vote, confirming a high degree But with 44 seats, the HDZ could not control the government in Sarajevo, nor could the SDA with 86. They faced a similar dilemma to that which they had encountered when Yugoslavia was originally formed. Like the HSS, the HDZ could ally itself with one of the larger parties or remain isolated and impotent. So the pattern of interwar Bosnian elections and politics was repeated in 1990.
The relative percentages of population were also similar to those in the 1920s and 1930s, but this time it was the Muslims, not the Serbs, who held the plurality. When Izetbegovic and SDA leaders demanded a majoritarian political system, they were ignoring the outcome of the 1990 elections. Bosnians had voted as members of groups, not as individuals. A majoritarian system can only work in polities that do not practice ethnic politics, where people vote as individuals, not as groups. When Muslims began to identify Bosnia-Herzegovina as "their state," Bosnia's Croats became alarmed. 83 Because their experience in Yugoslavia had been so bitterly disappointing, Bosnia's Croats opposed the creation of a unitary Bosnian state which seemed a miniature of the old Yugoslavia, complete with a hegemonic plurality. The Muslims, who were already 44% of the population and had the highest birth rate in the republic. Given Izetbegovi 's earlier writings and the Muslim nature of the SDA, a certain amount of unease among the Croats was to be expected, especially since, as David Rieff noted, the SDA had not been "as committed as it should have been to a multicultural Bosnia" until the war forced it to be. Even then, the party had its "fundamentalists" and "young fanatics who insisted on saying 'Es-salaam aleikum' instead of 'dobar dan' (good day), and proclaiming themselves mujahedin...."
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It seems clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a multicultural paradise prior to 1991, nor after. It was a battleground on which party leaders mobilized their co-nationalists, alliances constantly shifted, and each nationality pursued its own interests and illusions. Bosnia's history made mistrust of other nationalities prudent, and it was not surprising that its peoples distrusted one another in 1991. What is surprising is that Western scholars who knew better jettisoned history in favor of an ideal vision of Yugoslavia and Bosnia, a vision which distorted current realities and precluded an informed policy. The tendency for Yugoslavs to be overrepresented in larger urban areas suggests a cultural difference between city and countryside. Of the ten largest Bosnian municipalities, only two had Muslim 
